Vetoes, Values, and the Vistula: Poland’s 2025 Presidential Race and European Populism
As transatlantic relations buckle and Russia’s war machine rages in Ukraine, Poland’s 2025 presidential election will serve as a referendum on the country’s liberal course, EU unity, and business strategy. The outcome will almost certainly reshape regulatory frameworks, supply chain strategies, and market risks across Central Europe.
Leading up to election day on May 18, polls indicate a second-round runoff between opposition Law and Justice-backed (PiS) Karol Nawrocki and the ruling Civic Coalition’s Rafał Trzaskowski. After eight years of national-conservative rule under PiS, Poland’s 2023 parliamentary elections shifted control to the Civic Coalition under Prime Minister Donald Tusk whose pro-European agenda will be tested by the highly-anticipated vote this month.
Poland—traditionally an Atlanticist stronghold and the EU’s fifth most populous country—is at the center of NATO’s eastern flank, bordering Belarus and Kaliningrad and home to the Suwałki Gap—a Baltic chokepoint and Russia’s most valuable target. Poland consistently polls as the nation most favorable towards the United States in Europe.
What's at Stake
The two major candidates, Rafał Trzaskowski and Karol Nawrocki, represent sharply diverging visions at a time when global diplomacy trends towards interpersonal relations between heads of state and sovereignty-focused policy—such as economic protectionism, resistance to international commitments, and the revisionist reassertion of national identity—gains traction.
The current polling-favorite, Trzaskowski, is a pro-European Atlanticist who—at the head of a unified government—would likely realign with the European Union and stabilize Poland’s legal and regulatory frameworks critical to arbitration access and foreign investment, particularly in energy, digital infrastructure, and defense.
Meanwhile, the nationalist-conservative Nawrocki would likely implement his own take on a PiS-backed, veto-powered resistance, dealing significant blows to the Civic Coalition’s legislative capabilities, favoring an assertive, sovereigntist posture over commitments to EU legal frameworks, and leaning into transactional foreign policy rooted in “rePolonising” the economy.
Polish Presidential Powers
Poland operates under a three-branch division of power with a semi-presidential system granting the newly-elected head of state veto power, which requires a three-fifths parliamentary majority to override. Thus, despite the Civic Coalition’s 2023 victory, it struggles to legislate without accounting for incumbent President Andrzej Duda, who has vetoed, referred to the constitutional tribunal, or otherwise blocked significant rule-of-law, state budget, and business legislation at least 10 times. Duda has completed two five-year terms as president and is constitutionally barred from running a third time.
Duda’s impact on legislation has also extended to foreign investment: His approval of antidemocratic judicial reforms in 2017 contributed to a prolonged rule-of-law standoff with the EU, and in 2020, Duda vetoed a bill restricting foreign media ownership which aimed to force Discovery—an American company—to divest from broadcaster TVN.
The election comes as NATO is under strain with Russia’s war on Ukraine still unresolved and Poland remains a key force balancing important logistical and political roles in global support for Ukrainian sovereignty on the alliance's eastern flank. It is also among Ukraine’s closest allies as the largest host of Ukrainian refugees and ranks within the top five suppliers of military aid.
Meanwhile, the European Union is contending with internal pressures from nationalist and Euroskeptic forces that are testing its unity.
Nawrocki has asserted that he does not “envision Ukraine in any such structure – neither the European Union nor NATO – until important civilizational issues for Poland are resolved,” citing unresolved grievances such as the Volhynia massacre as a precondition for integration. However, Nawrocki supports Ukraine’s sovereignty, stating that “a strong, independent Ukraine capable of deterring Russia is in Poland’s strategic and geopolitical interest."
Trzaskowski, by contrast, calls for "a sincere conversation” about “the future of our (Polish-Ukrainian) relations, sensitivity to historical issues, and how negotiations on Ukraine’s membership will be very difficult” and frames Polish aid as both a strategic necessity and a moral obligation, calling for sustained support to counter Russian aggression.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE POLISH PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION FOR FOREIGN BUSINESS
Regulatory Environment: Climate, Coal, and Crops. Both major candidates support Poland's nuclear expansion, including the first planned plant in Pomerania. Trzaskowski would likely lean on EU taxonomy finance, whereas Nawrocki may seek to limit foreign contractor involvement in future phases to boost domestic equity and labor quotas.
Nawrocki promises to “re‑Polonise” strategic and legacy sectors—likely shielding coalmining in Silesia and blocking Green Deal policies. A harder line on Ukrainian grain and fertilizer imports is also likely; he has praised farmer road‑blocks and signaled he would widen the existing import ban if needed, putting Warsaw at odds with EU trade policy.
A Trzaskowski presidency would continue the Tusk government’s rapprochement with Brussels, which has already unfrozen €6.3 billion of up to €137 billion in Recovery and Cohesion Funds for Poland after it committed to restore judicial independence — money that can finance renewables, grid modernization, and hydrogen hubs.
Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Risk. A Trzaskowski win would almost certainly back Tusk’s commitment to judicial independence, locking‑in the government’s court‑reform bills, restoring the European Court of Justice’s authority in Poland, and reopening the country to investor‑state arbitration after years of uncertainty and fears around politicized justice.
On the other hand, Nawrocki has stated he would veto any reform that “subordinates Polish courts to foreign interests,” renewing uncertainty around contract enforcement, investor protection, and EU fines.
Strategic Sectors & Industrial Policy. Google, Amazon Web Services, and Microsoft have all made major investments in local cloud computing data centers in Poland in recent years. Trzaskowski has pledged to link data center growth to zero‑carbon power and EU digital market funding—potentially attracting more investment into foreign cloud, semiconductor‑packaging, and R&D as companies seek scalable EU bases beyond Western Europe.
Both candidates support record defense spending (5% of GDP in 2026), but their methods diverge. Nawrocki has not published a costed plan but wants offsets that channel work to the state‑owned PGZ group and other domestic plants and has courted U.S. contractors on the condition that final assembly be local.
Trzaskowski also supports domestic production quotas—proposing over 50% of defense spending be retained in Poland—but is more likely to keep NATO‑compatible open tenders and favor joint procurement frameworks that embed Polish manufacturers within Euro‑Atlantic supply chains.
Logistics, Transport, and Supply Chain Infrastructure. Both candidates acknowledge the strategic value of modernizing Poland’s transport and logistics infrastructure.
Trzaskowski is likely to accelerate investment in rail, port, and digital infrastructure aligned with the EU’s Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) framework, leveraging Recovery Fund mechanisms and Green Deal instruments to finance freight corridors and urban mobility upgrades.
Nawrocki supports expanding road freight corridors and deepening port capacity but has signaled opposition to EU-linked labor and emission standards.