No Safe Option for European Gas: The Effects of Another Azerbaijan-Armenia Conflict Would Be Felt Beyond the South Caucasus
There is a growing risk of an Azerbaijani military attack on Armenia in 2025, a development that we assess would have significant geopolitical implications for Europe and the wider Eurasian region.
On January 7, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev publicly restated his intention to forcibly secure unrestricted access to the “Zangezur corridor”—a land route that would provide Baku with unbridled access to its exclave of Nakhichevan—if stalled peace talks cannot resolve the impasse. Once again, Aliyev called into question the legitimacy of Armenia’s government, publicly describing it as a “fascist state” and declaring that “fascism must be eradicated.” Baku’s rhetoric may be aimed at coercing Yerevan to accept its Zangezur proposal and other contentious aspects of a potential peace agreement, but we judge that enough simmering tinder exists for political miscalculation on one or both sides.
On January 6, Baku claimed that Armenia fired on Azerbaijani forces in the Lachin region – the first time such a claim had been made since September – and such incidents could later serve as a pretext for an Azerbaijani offensive operation. As was demonstrated by its overwhelming successes in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, the military balance of power strongly favors Azerbaijan, which receives military support from Turkey and Israel.
Armenia Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan responded to Aliyev’s comments the next day, warning that Azerbaijan’s actions suggest it was seeking to renew hostilities: “combining this with the false information about the violation of the ceasefire by the Armenian army, this is aimed at creating a ‘justification’ for new escalation in the region.”
Status of Talks and the Zangezur Corridor Debate
Aliyev’s antagonistic comments stand in contrast to the optimism the parties had expressed for a deal after Russian-hosted talks in October, 2024. These talks failed to overcome sticking points, including about the Zangezur corridor concept, which remains a significant hurdle to a political breakthrough. While Armenia does not oppose a transport corridor in principle, which would improve its global connectivity and assist in normalizing ties with Turkey, Yerevan insists it should have security and customs authority over its own territory. Meanwhile, Azerbaijani officials believe that only Russian personnel should be responsible for policing the corridor, as per the 2020 ceasefire agreement.
By establishing the Zangezur corridor, Azerbaijan would increase connectivity between its capital and its exclave of Nakhichevan, which shares a border with Azerbaijan’s most important ally, Turkey. Developing road and rail infrastructure in southern Armenia could reduce bottlenecks along the Middle Corridor, which has become an increasingly vital trade route between Europe and China since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and provide a route that is 343km shorter than the existing lines over Georgia.
Recent geopolitical developments amongst key regional stakeholders may have emboldened Baku, increasing its perception that it can quickly overpower Armenia and avoid major repercussions on the international stage. Azerbaijan deftly exploited international instability with offensives in 2020, when the world was distracted by the pandemic, and 2023, when both Russia and the West were focused on Ukraine. Today, Baku may view the current state of global geopolitical crisis—such as the crisis in Gaza and the ongoing war in Ukraine—as an opportunity to achieve its regional goals.
Russia. As of late 2024, Russia has openly supported Azerbaijan’s demands for an unrestricted Zangezur corridor, reflecting Moscow’s breakdown in relations with Yerevan since the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war. Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Azerbaijan has emerged as a key trade and gas hub for Russia and is likely involved in the laundering of Russian energy exports. Russia’s support for the Zangezur concept also serves to punish and destabilize Armenia for its pivot away from Moscow and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).
Iran. Iran opposes the Zangezur corridor and in the past has warned it may back Armenia if Azerbaijan attempts to secure the transit route by force. However, Tehran’s ability to militarily support Yerevan will be complicated by the regime’s weakened capabilities after facing numerous setbacks in the Middle East, including in Syria, Gaza, and Lebanon. The fall of the Assad regime has also elevated the position of Turkey – Azerbaijan’s most important ally – which consequently may give Baku a longer leash to further challenge Iranian interests in the South Caucasus.
United States. Baku may believe that the incoming Trump administration will not be interested in maintaining President Biden’s heightened degree of U.S.-Armenian cooperation, including joint military exercises in Armenia in 2024 and the signing of a U.S.-Armenia strategic partnership agreement on January 14, 2025. Though the first Trump term saw little U.S. engagement with the South Caucasus, a recent breakdown in relations with Georgia – including the suspension of the U.S.-Georgia strategic partnership on November 30, 2024 – will favorably position Armenia should the incoming president choose to focus on the region.
Europe. Although Armenia enjoys growing ties with the EU, including deepening military cooperation with France, Azerbaijan’s importance as a trade hub as well as the need to shift gas supply away from Russia has muted Europe’s response to previous Azerbaijani actions, including the humanitarian crisis spurred by Baku’s attack on Karabakh in 2023. Baku also may believe that Brussels will be hesitant to complicate its relations with Turkey, which would probably back Azerbaijani military action against Armenia despite progress in normalization between Yerevan and Ankara in the first half of 2024.
What’s at Stake? If fighting breaks out between Azerbaijan and Armenia, some European energy supplies may be compromised, and the fallout of the war could disrupt the increasingly important Middle Corridor that connects Europe to Asia. Baku accounted for seven percent of European gas in 2023, and the January 1 2024 end of the agreement by which Russian gas was transited across Ukraine probably increased this dependence.
Azerbaijani aggression on sovereign Armenian territory would likely be met by calls for sanctions from some European heavyweights such as France, which has the closest ties to Armenia. It would be difficult to achieve a consensus on sanctions at the EU-level given warm Azerbaijani relations with EU members such as Hungary, and likely spare critical resources such as gas, but even bilateral sanctions of certain goods or military aid to Yerevan could result in Baku’s weaponization of energy supply to create leverage.
The conflict itself could endanger relevant infrastructure in both countries, such as through the kind of air attacks seen on oil refineries during the Russo-Ukrainian war. This risk was underscored in January, 2025 when a technical problem at Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz gas field disrupted millions of cubic meters of daily gas supply to Serbia and Bulgaria.
Regionally, sanctions or other military-related disruptions in Azerbaijan or Armenia as a result of a new outbreak of fighting could interfere with the Middle Corridor that connects Europe to China via Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Turkey. The transit route has taken a preeminent role in the transport of goods via land across Eurasia since the slowdown of the Northern Corridor through Russia following the latter’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.