Democratic Republic of the Congo: Critical Mineral Diplomacy To Court US and EU Favor Amidst Escalating Fighting
DRC President Felix Tshisekedi’s recent offer of his country’s valuable natural resources to the United States and the European Union (EU) in exchange for help repelling the Rwanda-backed M23 rebel advance in eastern DRC reveals his deep concern for the trajectory of the conflict in the face of an onslaught of rebel attacks backed by Rwandan President Paul Kagame.
Presidential spokesperson Tina Salama on 23 February said on X (formerly Twitter), “Tshisekedi invites the USA, whose companies source strategic raw materials from Rwanda, materials that are looted from the DRC and smuggled to Rwanda… to purchase them directly from [the country].” The DRC is home to the largest cobalt reserves in the world and the largest copper reserves in Africa.
There are no indications that the United States intends to intervene militarily; however, the US has repeatedly condemned Rwanda’s illegal actions in the DRC and at least publicly acknowledged the Tshiskedi mineral proposal. Just prior to Tshisekedi’s offer, senior US officials announced sanctions against Rwandan minister and former general, James Kabarebe, and an M23 chief.
As of 4 March, the EU also has not responded to the mineral offer but has been stern in its public rebuke of Rwanda for its backing of M23 in the DRC. Foreign Secretary David Lammy stated in February the UK would halt bilateral aid to Rwanda, saying the country receives about £32m ($40m) of bilateral aid from the UK every year. Lammy’s statement said along with the suspension of aid, the UK will impose other measures, such as looking into potential sanctions and suspending "future defense training assistance."
Kinshasha is almost certainly attuned to the perceived transactional nature of the new US administration. Last December, a small Congolese delegation visited Washington D.C. where it held a series of meetings with US officials close to then-incoming President Trump and who now hold key posts in the NSC and Pentagon, according to media reporting. The delegation at the time reportedly made a point of highlighting the DRC's key role in the race against China for critical minerals, such as cobalt.
Tshisekedi’s proposal for the US to purchase its critical minerals from the DRC, presumably at a fair or low market price, came after Ukrainian President Zelensky’s offer for the US to leverage its untapped mineral wealth in return for US security guarantees against Russia.
What's at Stake?
Since January, M23 has killed thousands of Congolese soldiers and civilians, capturing two key airports and two major eastern DRC cities, Goma and Bukavu, where significant mineral reserves are located. As of 4 March, it is currently marching toward a third. Kagame, for his part, denies involvement. The heaviest fighting is taking place in the eastern DRC where some six million metric ton reserves of cobalt—a mineral used in laptops, cellphones, and electric vehicles—are located, making it the largest reserves in the world.
Since at least late 2024, the rebel group M23 has traded some 120 tons of coltan every month from one regional mine, earning the rebel army $800,000 each month, and already controls much of Congo’s coltan.
Several internationally-owned mines operating in the DRC are in the direct pathway of the current fighting. For example, Alphamin Resources Corp., a Canadian-listed company operating the Bisie tin mine in North Kivu, made limited but notable public comments regarding the M23 rebel group’s activities, reflecting Alphamin’s priority of maintaining production and investor confidence amid escalating conflict.
Following M23’s seizure of Goma on January 27, 2025, Alphamin’s share price dropped significantly—by as much as a third—before closing down 9.4% at 97 Canadian cents, as reported by Bloomberg and Mining Weekly. After M23 captured Bukavu on February 16, 2025, Alphamin released a statement acknowledging an increased risk profile due to the ongoing fighting.
Looking Ahead
Tshisekedi is probably counting on sustained international pressure from the United States, EU, and United Nations in hopes that they will force Kagame to consider stopping the M23 armed group advance on eastern DRC. In his first interview since M23 seized swaths of his country’s territory, Tshisekedi likened the security situation in eastern DRC to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. MONUSCO, a 16,000-strong UN peacekeeping mission, has supported DRC armed forces (FARDC), since M23’s lightning advance in North Kivu in January, suffering casualties of at least six international peacekeepers to include three Malawians, two South Africans, and one Uruguayan.
As of 4 March, the U.S. has repeatedly condemned the advance of M23 in eastern DRC, supporting African-led mediation efforts by Kenya and more recently Angola. On 16 February, US Embassy Kinshasa reiterated Washington’s position that it does not support M23, cannot force DRC to negotiate, and respects DRC’s right to defend its territory.
UNSC resolution on 21 February called on Rwanda's military to stop supporting the M23 rebel group in eastern DRC and immediately withdraw all troops from Congolese territory "without preconditions."
In late February, the European Parliament calledfor the $935 million mineral (tin, tungsten, gold) deal to be suspended until Rwanda ceased all interference in Congo, “including exporting minerals mined from M23-controlled areas.”
For his part, Kagame may be counting on European indecisiveness against Rwanda, particularly given lingering guilt over inaction during the 1994 genocide, and US domestic distractions to allow him to continue backing M23 even in the face of public rebukes from Western capitals. For example, Europe helps pay for Rwanda’s military, which has protected European interests, including gas reserves in northern Mozambique managed by French energy company TotalEnergies, where Rwandan troops have been deployed to help put down an insurgency.
What M23 does next may indicate whether Eastern DRC will be annexed under the control of Rwanda or whether a protracted regional war may come. If M23 advance towards the mineral rich Katanga province in DRC, they would capture the epicenter of Kinshasa’s revenue stream. The South African military has reportedly sent troops and military equipment into Katanga to bolster the DRC government’s defenses. South Africa has also sent military flights to neighboring Burundi, suggesting they may also be equipping Rwanda’s rivals. Suggestions that Congo’s tinderbox is ready to explode would reshape the map of mineral diplomacy in central Africa.