As Gulf countries like the UAE and to a lesser extent Saudi Arabia increase capital investments and offer bailouts to Africa, their geopolitical aspirations to win favor and influence on the continent offers an alternative to dwindling Chinese loans and western aid, reshaping the traditional dynamics of African great power competition.

From 2014-2024, the UAE was consistently the fourth largest foreign direct investor in Africa behind China, the EU, and the United States. Recently, the UAE has emerged as Africa’s largest backer of new business projects with Emirati companies committing $110 billion to projects between 2019 and 2023. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia pledged $25.6 billion to projects in Africa during the same time.

• Much African gold, both legal and smuggled, passes through the UAE. In mid-2024, the DRC government announced plans to acquire Primera Group's 55% stake in Primera Gold, a major Abu Dhabi-based gold trader, and renamed it DRC Gold Trading SA.

• In March 2024, International Resources Holding (IRH), a subsidiary of Abu Dhabi's $240 billion conglomerate International Holding Company (IHC), chaired by the UAE national security advisor Sheikh Tahnoon bin Zayed al-Nahyan, acquired a 51% majority stake in Zambia's Mopani Copper Mines (MCM) previously owned by Glencore for $1.1 billion. IRH has also expressed interest in investing in mines in Angola, Kenya, and Tanzania.

• Saudi Arabia’s participation at the Critical Minerals Africa 2024 Summit reflects the Kingdom’s interest in Africa’s rich mineral resources as the petrostate seeks to diversify its investment portfolio away from oil dependency. In October 2024, Saudi Arabia’s flagship mining company Ma’aden and the country’s $925 billion Public Investment Fund announced a proposed deal to buy a minority stake in Canadian miner First Quantum Minerals’ copper and nickel assets in Zambia.

In a bid to increase its influence on the continent, the UAE in recent years has bailed out three African states—Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia—supplanting Chinese influence as it has reduced its own financial support and cementing the Gulf nation as a reliable partner both politically and economically. Egypt in 2023 faced economic challenges as the country risked defaulting on its foreign debt, which over the previous decade more than tripled to $155 billion, while both Sudan and Ethiopia had to obtain Emirati assistance due in large part to a severe shortage of foreign currency reserves (see visual attached).

• After a $3 billion International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout loan, Egypt in early 2024 accepted a $35 billion commitment from the UAE’s sovereign wealth fund, ADQ, which prompted an additional $8 billion aid package from both the IMF and EU and an additional $6 billion aid package from the World Bank. The initial $35 billion lifeline from the UAE went to the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) to develop Ras el-Hek, a new Mediterranean tourism hot spot.

• Leading up to 2018, the UAE channeled funds totaling $7.6 billion in the form of support to Sudan's central bank, in private investments, and via the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development. This economic bailout bolstered liquidity and foreign currency reserves at the Central Bank of Sudan to avoid a financial crisis in the country.

• In 2018, the UAE pledged a $3 billionaid and investment package to Ethiopia. This package included a $1 billion deposit into Ethiopia's central bank to alleviate a severe foreign currency shortage, and an additional $2 billion allocated for investments in sectors such as tourism, renewable energy, and agriculture.

UAE and Saudi ambitions in Africa likely will align with US interests economically, politically, and militarily as these middle powers disrupt Chinese influence on the continent, potentially providing new investment opportunities for US business and an alternative supply chain to US-backed initiatives on the continent. Kenyan President William Ruto told reportersin May 2024 “the UAE is a very good [economic] partner to Kenya and many other countries” and in January 2025, Ruto and His Highness Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan signeda landmark deal aimed at increasing more than $3.3 billion of bilateral trade, the first of its kind for the UAE with a mainland African nation.

• As of January 2025, the DRC, a leading supplier of cobalt, was seekingto attract Saudi mining investors to diversify its partnerships and reduce reliance on Chinese companies. This initiative probably aims to mitigate economic risks associated with overdependence on a single partner, China.

• Dubai-based DP World, a global logistics firm operating in nearly a dozen African ports to include Mozambique, Algeria, and Angola, acknowledged in May 2024 an overarching strategy of connecting Dubai to the continent via trade, a strategy shared by Dubai that rivals Beijing port presence. In the same report, finance minister of Somaliland, the breakaway republic in which DP World has invested heavily, said of the Emirates’ growing influence, “the UAE is a new superpower in Africa.”

• US and UAE interests may align most strikingly this year in Somaliland, which has sought sovereign recognition since 1991 when the breakaway country declared unilateral independence from Somalia. In exchange for recognition as a country, a process that has been formally initiated by at least one US Congressman late last year, Somaliland has offered the US a military base in strategic Berbera Port which ranks second to Djibouti in Africa as a logistics hub and has received large investmentsfrom Dubai-based DP World since at least 2022. A US Red Sea Port in Berbera would help the US counter the Chinese in the Horn of Africa and aligns with Somaliland’s broader aspirations for UAE-backed economic growth and US-backed international recognition.