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MESSAGE FROM THE CHAIRMAN

Dear Colleagues,

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A phrase often coined in our line of work is “the business of business is politics.” With dozens of national elections in 2025 across key markets—from Latin America to Africa to Southeast Asia—business leaders face a complex and fast-changing geopolitical landscape. Ballot box outcomes this year will undoubtedly play a part in reshaping the international risk landscape, opening (and in some cases closing) avenues for strategic engagement. At a time of growing uncertainty, understanding where political winds are shifting is essential to successfully managing businesses abroad.

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For this newsletter, my team of analysts offer insights on what these transitions mean for businesses with global ambitions. We don’t focus on winners or losers. Instead, we frame political competition worldwide in ways that matter most to our private sector clients. At Arcanum Global, we pride ourselves on finding solutions to your most challenging and enduring business problems—either through our insightful geopolitical analysis, unique access and placement worldwide, or curated on-the-ground insights—so that you can confidently navigate the uncertainty that is inherent in managing a global business reliant on complex supply chains and highly sensitive to today’s fluid market shifts. Politics isn’t noise – it’s a signal for business.

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Thank you for your continued trust and partnership.

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Ron Wahid
Chairman, Arcanum

REFLECTIONS FROM THE BOARD

Geopolitical analysis requires a broad understanding of the national instruments of power— Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic—as well as the foundational concept that nations will act in their own national interests. The changes in the last half century’s rules based order brings not only instability but opportunity. It is critical to navigate the variables associated with each nation and understand how their national interests play against those great powers vying for their support as well as regional powers of influence.

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Former Director of the US Defense Intelligence Agency, Lt. General Robert Ashley

ARCANUM'S EXECUTIVES

Mr. Charles Eberly

Admiral Denis C. Blair

MAJ. GEN. James B. Linder

Field Marshal Charles R. L. Guthrie

Mr. James Clad

LT. GEN. Robert P. Ashley Jr.

Mr. Larry Henderson

MAJ. GEN. (RET) James E. Kraft Jr.

Mr. Calvin R. Humphrey

ELECTIONS 2025:
THEMES SHAPING GLOBAL RISK AND OPPORTUNITY

As an analyst at heart, I have long avoided overemphasizing polling data or forecasting election winners; valuable tools, yes, but often incomplete. Instead, I prefer to focus on the cultural and structural dynamics that shape not just who wins, but what that wins means for policy, business, and stability. In our business, this translates into understanding context. As we have seen in the United States and beyond, it’s the context—culture wars, power shifts, economic grievances—that often determines the real-world impact of an election.

 

In 2025 and into 2026, dozens of countries will head to the polls, creating a wave of uncertainty for global business. At Arcanum Global, we encourage our partners to watch not just the votes, but the themes driving them. As you prepare your business to navigate the months ahead, here are the themes we believe are the most important to understand:

Larry Henderson
Vice President & Head of Analytic Intelligence

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Ballots and Backlash: Populism Reshaping the Political Map

Around the world, electoral contests in 2025 are testing traditional party loyalties. From Latin America’s swing away from entrenched leftist parties to the surge in right-wing nationalism in Europe, business leaders must prepare for unexpected political realignments. These shifts often emerge from deep dissatisfaction with inequality, corruption, or crime and can lead to sudden swings in policy that catch companies off guard. Populist platforms may promise deregulation or foreign investment, but can just as easily deliver protectionism, currency controls, or judicial politicization.

Security, Sovereignty, and the Crisis of Governance

In regions from the Sahel to Central America, the 2025 election cycle is unfolding against a backdrop of insecurity.  We are seeing elections held amidst civil unrest (CAR), organized crime pressures (Honduras), and contested borders (Guyana-Venezuela). Weak institutions, public distrust, and militarized policing increasingly shape post-election outcomes. Businesses must assess not only physical security risks, but also the legal and regulatory volatility that stems from fragile governance environments.

Great Power Competition Goes Local

Whether its China’s role in Serbian infrastructure, Russia’s presence in CAR, or the US vying for energy dominance in Guyana, global powers are projecting influence through elections outside of their own sovereign borders. 2025 will show how voters—and the leaders they elect—tilt toward or away from Beijing, Moscow, or Washington DC. For foreign firms, these alignments carry real-world consequences: from sanctions exposure and supply chain rerouting, to changes in licensing, arbitration, and compliance environments.

Markets in Motion: Elections and the Business Climate

Inflation, inequality, and commodity politics are at the heart of many 2025 election narratives. In Bolivia and Chile, resource nationalism is being debated at the ballot box. In Guyana, surging GDP from oil is testing institutions’ ability to govern boom conditions. And in the United States, proposed secondary tariffs could drastically reconfigure global trade flows. Meanwhile, immigration policy is once again a flashpoint in the wake of the US election with potential consequences for labor availability, wage pressures, and cross-border workforce mobility in key industries. Understanding how political outcomes shape fiscal, labor, and investment policy will be essential for companies with cross-border exposure.

ANALYTIC DEEPDIVE

GUYANA'S OIL BOOM ELECTION:
ENERGY, EQUITY, AND GEOPOLITICAL STAKES

Summary

Guyana’s national election on 1 September will determine whether the country continues its pro-investment trajectory under President Ali or shifts toward nationalist demands for oil contract renegotiation. With ExxonMobil’s production soaring and GDP growth averaging 47%, political pressure is building over perceived unequal wealth distribution and foreign influence. Tensions with Venezuela over Essequibo—a contested resource rich area that makes up almost two-thirds of Guyana’ territory—alongside calls by the vocal political opposition to revisit the Production Sharing Agreement are heightening investor risk. A second Ali terms would likely maintain policy continuity while an opposition win would bring uncertainty to foreign investors.

President Irfaan Ali of the ruling People's Progressive Party (PPP) is seeking a second term this September, campaigning on a platform of continued economic growth, infrastructure development, and further openness to foreign investment.

Since taking office, the Ali administration has overseen one of the fastest-growing economies globally, driven by offshore oil production along the Starbroek Block. Only six years after first production in late 2019, the South American country now produces approximately 645,000 barrels per day and projections suggest output could double by 2027, marking Guyana among the world’s top oil producers. According to the IMF, Guyana's real GDP grew at a nearly unprecedented average annual rate of 47% between 2022 and 2024, largely due to resource extraction and rising export revenues.

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  • Amidst the economic boom, Guyana’s opposition forces argue that the newly found oil wealth is not being equitably distributed, which has contributed to a relatively tight race given the economic boom. While GDP per capita has officially risen from under $7000 US dollars in 2020 to over $20000 US dollars in 2023, a significant portion of Guyana's population has not experienced this increase in wealth and feel left behind.

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  • ​Anecdotal reporting suggests that many Guyanese voters still feel betrayed by Ali despite attempts by his ruling party to reverse wealth inequality in the country through generous one-time cash handouts and tuition relief for university students.

However, the opposition remains deeply divided, giving Ali a political advantage as the elections approach.

Aubrey Norton, leader of the opposition People's National Congress Reform (PNCR) party, insists on maintaining his candidacy, despite 69% of opposition supporters preferring Norton step down. Meanwhile, Nigel Hughes of the Alliance for Change (AFC) party has expressed a willingness to step aside in favor of a unified opposition candidate, but coalition talks have failed to materialize into a joint platform and many believe Norton is to blame. The absence of a coordinated strategy could hinder the opposition's ability to mount an effective challenge to Ali and the PPP.

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  • While the Ali’s ruling PPP has maintained relatively consistent in its messaging on energy policy and macroeconomic planning, a powerful opposition (however unclear in its goal and still divided) introduces a higher degree of risk to the future of foreign business in the September election.

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  • Indeed, the opposition has some policy quivers in its arsenal in addition to frustration around wealth inequity.  The IMF has repeatedly emphasized the importance of economic diversification. Although the government has made initial investments in sectors such as agriculture, construction, and tourism, these remain underdeveloped compared to the dominant energy industry. Over-reliance on oil could leave the economy vulnerable to external shocks, like Venezuela before them, particularly if global demand for fossil fuels declines in the long term or if international climate policies evolve rapidly.

What's At Stake?

The impact of the upcoming elections is potentially profound. If the current administration secures a second term, existing policies promoting private sector investment and infrastructure-led development are expected to continue. Conversely, a divided or newly empowered opposition, particularly one less aligned with the PPP’s market-oriented policies, could introduce policy uncertainty, particularly if faced with pressure to renegotiate contracts or increase state oversight of the energy sector.

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  • US energy firms, especially ExxonMobil and Chevron, remain among the largest foreign stakeholders in Guyana. The scale of investment and the strategic nature of the country's reserves have made Guyana a priority in US economic engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean and the election outcomes will be of top priority.

 

  • Norton’s campaign has emphasized the need to renegotiate the 2016 Production Sharing Agreement between the Guyanese Government and the ExxonMobil-led consortium, who lead all exploration and extraction efforts in the country. Norton and his supporters argue that the agreement minimized profits for Guyana, criticizing the terms as being overly favorable to the consortium and detrimental to national interests.

 

  • Despite Ali’s and ExxonMobil’s insistence that the agreement is binding, Norton claims to have found a legal route to renegotiation under Article 32.1 of the PSA to pressure the consortium to return to the table. In response, ExxonMobil Guyana President Alistair Routledge said that the company has "no interest" in renegotiating the contract.

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​This standoff raises concerns among international investors about contract sanctity and the stability of Guyana’s investment climate post-election. Should an opposition-led government attempt to impose changes unilaterally or pursue aggressive renegotiation tactics, there is a real risk that it could trigger legal challenges or dissuade future energy investment, particularly from US-based firms.

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  • Looking ahead, while inflation has remained moderate despite high growth, capacity constraints and labor shortages have begun to emerge. Managing inflationary pressures, improving education and workforce development, and strengthening public institutions will be central to ensuring that oil wealth contributes to long-term development rather than exacerbating inequality or governance challenges no matter who wins the vote.

The Guyana–Venezuela Standoff

Guyana’s territorial dispute with Venezuela over the Essequibo region introduces a layer of complexity into the election and the impact of its outcome. In recent months, Venezuela has escalated its claims by organizing local elections in the disputed area, prompting strong objections from Guyana and widespread condemnation from international actors, including the US.

 

  • The potential for escalation remains a risk factor, especially given the proximity of key oil installations to the disputed territory. For US firms operating in the region, despite assurances from Brazil, the US, and the EU—countries that have become increasingly reliant on Guyanese oil since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—instability will still very likely impact risk assessments, insurance costs, and investment decisions.

WESTERN HEMISPHERE ELECTION SNAPSHOT

Latin America Votes:
What the 2025 Elections Mean for Business and Risk

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Executive Summary

In Latin America, growing dissatisfaction toward incumbent left-wing administrations has led to increased support for the right as Bolivia, Chile, and Honduras prepare for elections this year. While it is too early to predict the results, voters in all three countries are increasingly linking leftist leadership to poor governance, economic stagnation, and rising insecurity. As each country weighs a pivot away from leftist governance, the prospect of more market-friendly, pro-Western leadership could open key sectors—such as in critical minerals—to foreign capital, particularly from the United States.

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However, the risk of political fragmentation or leftist resurgence remains high, threatening regulatory stability. Indeed, these elections could very well recalibrate geopolitical alignments in a region increasingly caught between Chinese and US influence, making 2025 a pivotal year for foreign businesses hoping to boost profits in these parts of the Western Hemisphere.

BOLIVIA

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Summary

Bolivia’s leftist Movement for Socialism (MAS) party faces serious internal fractures and declining public trust ahead of the August 2025 election. Mounting inflation (13.2%), fuel shortages, disillusionment with MAS’s ties to China, and poor governance have eroded its rural base. With former President Evo Morales barred from running and no unifying successor, a center-right opposition is gaining ground.  If victorious, new leadership may reverse state control of lithium in Bolivia and align closer toward Western investors.

In Bolivia, the powerful leftist MAS (Movement for Socialism) party, which oversaw the country’s current economic crisis, is approaching the general election in August deeply divided and at serious risk of losing its once firm grip on power.

Home to the world’s largest lithium reserves, Bolivia has become increasingly important to strategic competition between the US and China. In recent years, the MAS party has deepened ties with China, allowing Beijing to explore and extract this critical resource. At the same time, mounting public debt, over dependence on natural resources, state intervention in the economy, and political instability have eroded trust in government institutions and sparked clashes between protestors and Bolivian police in recent months. Declining support for current president Luis Arce and the ban of a key public figure, the popular former president Evo Morales, from running for an unprecedented and unconstitutional fourth term, have left MAS without a consensus candidate to rally behind with only two months before the highly anticipated vote for both the presidential post and the legislature.

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  • The unprecedented divisions within MAS, coupled with widespread public dissatisfaction over economic mismanagement, inflation reaching 13.2% in early 2025, and persistent fuel shortages, have eroded the party's traditional support base.

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  • MAS voters are typically made up of rural Bolivians, the youth, indigenous communities, and the poor who identified strongly with the party’s anti-establishment messaging and promises of equitable wealth distribution and economic growth. As such, MAS’ failure to keep the cost of goods down coupled with growing discontent toward Chinese economic influence leave their supporters feeling betrayed.

Bolivia's Right-Leaning Opposition Ready to Strike.

The turmoil within MAS and the resultant public dissatisfaction with the policies of the incumbent party present a unique opportunity for the center-right opposition which, despite its own challenges in unifying behind a single candidate, is in a stronger position to win the presidency than at any point in the past two decades.

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  • As opposed to the left-wing MAS, Bolivia’s right-wing candidates generally propose opening the market, creating a more favorable environment for private investment by privatizing loss-making state-owned enterprises, promoting public-private partnerships in key sectors, reducing tax burden on individuals and corporations alike, and industrializing its natural resources.

What's At Stake?

The Bolivian left is still very strong and if MAS manage to remain cohesive enough to win the election later this year, past precedent suggests the critical lithium sector will fall further under state control. If the opposition can secure an election surprise, the incoming administration is likely to reverse recent nationalization trends, liberalize the economy, and pursue closer ties with Western investors, particularly in the lithium and hydrocarbons sectors, potentially reshaping Bolivia’s investment climate and regional alignment back to the US and away from China, reversing ties MAS made with Beijing in recent years.

HONDURAS

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Summary

Public dissatisfaction is growing with Honduras’ ruling LIBRE party ahead of the November 2025 elections. President Xiomara Castro’s hardline policies, China alignment, and crackdowns on economic zones have rattled investors. LIBRE’s candidate, Rixi Moncada, faces credibility gaps. Meanwhile, center-right opponents Asfura and Nasralla are polling competitively and may reposition Honduras toward stronger ties with the United States and Taiwan.

In Honduras, the ruling left-wing LIBRE party faces growing public discontent ahead of the general election this November, a vote that may determine whether the country remains squarely aligned with China or pivots to the United States as an investor of choice.

After three years, President Xiomara Castro's state of emergency, originally implemented to address violence and extortion linked to transnational criminal organizations, has done little to improve public safety and, conversely, drawn criticism from Amnesty International over alleged human rights abuses. Moreover, the controversial policy has heightened tensions with the public and deterred foreign investment, particularly from Western firms concerned about regulatory unpredictability and legal risk. Notably, LIBRE’s crackdown on special economic zones and unpredictable policy shifts have weakened investor confidence.

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  • Rixi Moncada, the LIBRE party’s presidential candidate and current defense minister, has struggled to distance herself from Castro’s unpopular policies; her support ranges widely between 10% and 45% depending on the poll.

What's At Stake?

Conservative opposition candidates Nasry Asfura and Salvador Nasralla are both polling competitively for the presidential race, with each consistently capturing about 20-25% of voter support. Both challengers support strengthening Honduras’s position as an attractive destination for foreign investment. Nasralla has rejected the prospect of a Free Trade Agreement with China and advocates for restoring diplomatic and trade relations with the US and Taiwan.

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  • Meanwhile, Moncada’s perceived alignment with the current administration and preference for stronger ties with China raise concerns for US interests and Western investors. Moncada has not presented a clear economic platform, but her prior role in budget expansion and state-led development as a former finance minister suggests a continuation of nationalization and inflation trends.

CHILE

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Summary

Chile is experiencing a political rightward shift driven by dissatisfaction with left-wing President Boric’s economic and security policies. Center-right frontrunner Evelyn Matthei has pledged $6 billion in spending cuts and investor-friendly reforms. Her pragmatic tone appeals to voters and investors alike, contrasting with far-right rivals’ polarizing rhetoric. If elected, Matthei would likely deepen US ties and open key sectors, including lithium, to private capital.

In Chile, growing dissatisfaction with President Gabriel Boric’s left-wing administration has fueled a rightward shift ahead of the general election this November, paving the way for a potential political shift that favors foreign businesses.

Persistent concerns over public safety, inflation, and economic stagnation have led many Chileans to favor candidates who are prioritizing stability and pro-market reforms. The latest Centro de Estudios Publicos (CEP) survey tracked this trend in the Chilean electorate and concluded that public order and economic growth now outweigh social equality as voter priorities, areas traditionally associated with the political right.

Chile’s Right-Leaning Opposition Positioning for the Win. Center-right candidate Evelyn Matthei currently leads the polls.

Emphasizing fiscal responsibility, institutional stability, and public-private collaboration, she has pledged to reduce public spending by $6 billion and promote infrastructure and housing investment through private sector partnerships. Unlike her rivals on the far-right, Matthei has positioned herself as an ideological moderate, favoring pragmatic governance while remaining tough on transnational crime.

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  • At the 2025 Chilean Economic Forum in March 2025, Matthei railed against the incumbent administration stating, “under this government, we will have experienced less growth than under any previous administration. Not even during the pandemic or the social uprising did we grow as little as we have under this government. (…) Public spending is increasing, raising the national debt, suffocating the private sector, and mortgaging the future well-being of the next generations, this is a grave irresponsibility.” At the time, Matthei outlined her plan to solve this crisis stating, “this government, in 2025, must cut at least $3 billion dollars and then we will cut an additional $6 billion dollars so that Chile can truly heal and grow again,” according to Latin American news site InfoBae.

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  • ​Investor confidence has surged in response to Matthei’s political rise, with Chile’s IPSA stock index reaching record highs. In contrast, while both far-right candidates Jose Antonio Kast and Johannes Kaiser support free-market policies and oppose closer ties with China, controversial social positions and authoritarian rhetoric have raise concerns among some foreign businesses about the prospect for political volatility and regulatory unpredictability.

What's At Stake?

Chile’s status as a global leader in the clean energy transition through its immense lithium reserves heighten the election’s global significance. All major candidates—not matter their political leanings—support strengthening relations with the US while distancing from China, signaling potential openings for US investment, particularly in mining and energy in the years ahead. However, the election outcome could shape Chile’s regulatory landscape and determine whether the country makes progress on its current investment-friendly path or face increased political risk under more polarizing leadership.

AFRICA ELECTION DEEP DIVE

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC:
LOOMING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS MAY SHAKE UP RUSSIAN STRANGLEHOLD ON MINING SECTOR

Summary

December 2025 elections in CAR may challenge Wagner Group’s hold on the mining sector. Mounting instability, declining public support, and regional outreach efforts by President Toudera are opening space for other partners, including African and Western security partners with high-risk appetites. Wagner’s grip has restricted foreign investment in CAR’s gold and diamond sectors, but a shift in control could unlock major contracts and legitimize the country’s extractive potential under improved oversight.

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The stage is set for a round of destabilizing presidential elections this December in CAR as the country braces for a vote that seems increasingly likely to unleash a new wave of political violence, testing the embattled Wagner Group’s ability to maintain order in a country that has become disillusioned with its presence. Should Wagner’s influence wane, CAR’s vast natural resources may become more accessible to legitimate mining interests. Most observers expect incumbent Faustin Touadéra, who has held office since 2016, to secure a third term after controversial constitutional changes in 2023 cleared a path for him to compete against an opposition he treats with an increasingly heavy hand. However, the growing anti-government mood on the streets, limited international attention, and conflicts in neighboring Sudan and the DRC risk further destabilizing the security environment, potentially testing Wagner’s position as the Touadéra government’s main security guarantor. With other security actors already making inroads in the country, a shakeup of the status quo could create opportunities to loosen Wagner’s grip over CAR’s governance structures and natural resource sector.

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  • In his quest to retain power, Touadéra has stymied electoral competition, raising the risk of civil unrest in the capital of Bangui. Touadéra has barred former prime ministers Martin Ziguélé and Anicet-Georges Dologuélé from running in the upcoming election due to new prohibitions on dual citizens holding political office.

 

  • In December 2023, one opposition parliamentarian was imprisoned for opposing the referendum eliminating presidential term limits, and in March of this year the brothers of another former prime minister, Henri-Marie Dondra, were arrested. Meanwhile, Touadéra’s “Shark” paramilitary group regularly harasses, detains and allegedly even tortures and kills CAR citizens, according to opposition media, striking fear in voters who might lean towards the opposition since Touadéra took office almost a decade ago.

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Touadéra has been able to use these authoritarian tactics because he is supported by the Wagner Group in a relationship of convenience that has increasingly made the CAR leader beholden to Moscow. As his personal protection providers with networks across the CAR government, Wagner is well-positioned to replace Touadéra with someone more compliant should he seem a threat to their position in the country – a danger which Touadéra is likely well aware and which has previously incentivized him to seek other security partnerships. 
 

  • As payment for its protection services, Wagner has established significant control over the country’s mining sector including the N’Dassima gold mine—the country’s only industrial mine, worth $100 million a year—as well as a number of smaller artisanal gold and diamond mining sites and a lumber business. These resources are subsequently smuggled out of the country, ensuring that although political elites may receive rents for Wagner operations, very few of the proceeds are reinvested in CAR, according to the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project.

Elections Amidst Growing Insecurity

As they have in the past, CAR’s elections could serve as a catalyst for the further deterioration of the country’s already fraught security situation. Outside the capital, the country’s bubbling civil war has reached its most violent point in three years even as Touadéra seeks a peace breakthrough ahead of the elections, adding to the unpredictable nature of the vote. The civil war has split the country along multiple ethnic and religious lines since the mostly Muslim Séléka rebel group overthrew President Francoise Bozize in 2013 before it was dissolved into various successor militias later that year; now the chief opponent to CAR’s national army, FACA, is the Bozizé-led Coalitions of Patriots for Change (CPC) which formed to violently contest the 2021-2021 general elections, with other local militias and inter-sectional violence adding to the overall picture of instability across most of the country.  

 

  • The potential for election-related civil unrest in Bangui was illustrated by a demonstration of thousands of protestors, including former prime minister Martin Zeguélé, at an April 4 rally organized by the anti-Touadéra and Wagner-critical “Bloc for the Defense of the Constitution” (BRDC). In 2023, a member of the BRDC – former president of the National Transitional Council Alexandre Nguendet – threatened to overthrow Touadéra by force if necessary, though this idea was opposed by many factions within the coalition.

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  • Touadéra has initiated dialogue with armed groups ahead of the elections, yet violence against civilians is at its highest point since Wagner’s offensive in 2021-2022, per ACLED data, mostly because of Christian anti-Balaka groups targeting Muslim Fulani pastoralists. Instability in neighboring DRC and especially Sudan – which has precipitated the arrival of tens of thousands of refugees in CAR’s north – also threatens to destabilize the situation via spillover and the facilitation of illicit economies that help fund armed groups.

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  • International organizations active in CAR almost certainly are under-resourced to manage escalating violence in the wake of elections.  Aside from a constrained mandate, the over 17,000-strong UN peacekeeping force (MINUSCA) complained last year that it had received only a third of the requested levels of funding for local elections, which have now been delayed until August 2025.

Wagner and the Vote

These conditions may test Wagner’s position in the country because the group faces resource strains as well as competition from Moscow, potentially driving existing demand for other security providers to fill the void. Though Wagner’s entanglement with the CAR government and military likely precludes it from being totally booted out for the foreseeable future, additional violence that further stretches Wagner’s capacities could create more space for greater leverage from other actors. Probably mindful of the deleterious effect the Wagner monopoly has had on its independence, Bangui has already invited other African and even Western partners to help manage the country’s conflict.

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  • Wagner’s ability to surge forces in the event of a worsening crisis is doubtful, largely because of manpower challenges. Across its entire network, Wagner now has only about 5,000 men, according to a reliable August 2024 assessment by the UK’s Ministry of Defense – and probably less with mass casualty events occurring in 2024 in Mali, and Russian state-run Africa Corps continuing to absorb Wagner fighters.The estimated number of Wagner troops in CAR is roughly 1,500.

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  • Although Russian intelligence likely now supervises Wagner since the death of former leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, reports that Moscow is pressuring CAR to sign a contract with the Russian MOD-controlled Africa Corps group suggest that Wagner’s relations with Moscow have not normalized since Prigozhin’s failed mutiny in June 2023. Bangui and Moscow continue to deepen relations on a bilateral level, including through Russian offers of security guarantees in January 2025, though there are reasons to doubt the Kremlin’s level of commitment to the embattled nation: Africa Corps is yet deploy on a large scale in any country other than Libya and it is unlikely that the earning potential in CAR – or the perhaps several hundred million dollars Wagner makes there per year – is a key priority for Moscow.

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  • Perhaps as a hedge, Touadéra has conducted outreach with other security partners, in particular the Rwandan government and, to much lesser extent, America’s Bancroft PMC, suggesting that a crisis could present opportunities for reduced Wagner influence. Hundreds of Rwandan troops are deployed on a bilateral basis—like Wagner they are mainly focused on safeguarding artisanal gold and diamond mines—and also form the largest MINUSCA contingent with over 2,000 troops. US firm PMC Bancroft established a small presence in CAR in 2024 at the request of CAR officials, though it does not appear to have made a significant impact. The recent deal between Eric Prince and the DRC points to the expansion of the role of US security contractors during the second Trump administration, though the new administration is yet to show significant interest in CAR.

What's At Stake?

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CAR is abundant in natural resources including gold, diamond, copper, and uranium, but has largely failed to exploit these on an industrial scale due to its consistently perilous security environment. Wagner’s influence and control over key mining sites has further diminished Bangui’s ability to attract legitimate mining interests, and quashed past efforts by foreign companies – such as Canada’s AXIM – to implement plans that promised to be highly lucrative. A shift in power dynamics could pave the way for mutually beneficial contracts and the realization of CAR’s significant potential as a commodity exporter.

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  • Probably under Wagner’s pressure, the CAR government has helped facilitate the Russian mercenaries’ control over the country’s mining sector at the expense of other companies. For example, the CAR government transferred AXIM’s license for the N’dassima gold mine (pictured above) to Wagner in 2019, and in June 2024, suspended the license of even a Chinese gold and diamond mining company, accusing it of cooperating with rebels. Wagner also controls a number of smaller artisanal mines that it has largely seized by force in its campaigns against rebels and civilians alike.

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  • However, in November 2024, the Kimberley Process, which regulates conflict diamonds, lifted its eleven-year suspension of diamond exports from CAR, paving the way for more legitimate business to operate in the country. CAR’s diamond mining sector is entirely artisanal, though a 2018 report by the US Geological Survey claimed its annual output could run as high as 470,000 carats (which would make it close to one of the top ten diamond-producing nations). Because the Wagner Group as well as Russian diamonds as a whole remain sanctioned, it will be unable to directly benefit from the legitimization of this part of CAR’s mining sector. This ensures it will seem even more of a liability in the eyes of many CAR citizens.

EUROPE'S CHINA DILEMMA: ECONOMIC TIES, POLITICAL RISK, AND PUBLIC BLOW BACK

Summary

In parts of Europe, deepening economic ties with China are driving political instability. In Hungary, backlash over BRI-linked infrastructure projects and a Chinese university campus has sparked public protests. In Georgia, opposition leaders accuse the ruling party of selling sovereignty for short-term loans, while civic unrest grows in response to opaque Chinese investments. These cases illustrate how China’s economic footprint, most notably through Belt and Road Initiative projects, can erode public trust and provoke backlash in fragile democracies—in our out of an election year—exposing foreign firms to reputational and regulatory risk.

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China’s economic footprint across parts of Europe has become a growing source of domestic political friction, especially in countries where democratic institutions are strained or corruption endemic. In 2025, that friction is translating into street-level unrest and electoral consequences – especially in Hungary, Serbia, and Georgia where close cooperation with Beijing is increasingly seen by citizens as synonymous with elite cooperation and poor governance. The decision to embrace Chinese plans like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is undoubtedly a symptom, but also a contributor to issues like corruption, authoritarianism, and weak rule of law that serve as powder kegs for political instability in Europe. As such, the extent of European economic ties to the PRC can be both an indicator and cause of political upheaval.


In Serbia, the most direct case of China’s economic influence leading to political unrest came when the roof of the main railway station of Serbia’s second-largest city Novi Sad collapsed – killing sixteen people – on November 1, 2024, just four months after Chinese contractors complete three years of renovations under the purview of the BRI. The incident sparked months of mass protests, resulting in the resignation of Serbia’s prime minister on March 19, and the protests continue as of June 5, 2025.

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  • While authorities insist that the renovations did not focus on the roof and therefore did not cause the collapse, the government has also been reticent to release details about the contracts – typical of the murkiness involved in partnerships with Chinese firms involved in the BRI.

 

  • BRI projects have a track record of poor outcomes: according to a 2021 study by AidData, 35% of BRI projects have involved controversies, such as thousands of cracks quickly emerging after the 2016 completion of the $2 billion Chinese-built Coca Codo Sinclair dam in Ecuador, and a Chinese-constructed, 30-storey apartment building collapsing in Thailand following the 2025 earthquake.

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In Hungary, the government’s deepening economic relationship with China—including major infrastructure projects and plans for a Chinese university campus in Budapest—has drawn widespread public protest. While Prime Minister Viktor Orban touts his “Eastern Opening” as a counterbalance to the EU, many Hungarians view the influx of Chinese capital as a backdoor for unaccountable influence.

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  • A 2025 referendum initiative aimed at blocking new Chinese-led projects has become a symbolic rallying point for opposition movements, especially among younger, pro-EU voters.

 

In Georgia, Chinese investment in critical transport corridors and energy projects has become a lightning rod in an already volatile political environment.  As the country lurches between East and West, opposition parties accuse the ruling Georgian Dream party of trading sovereignty for short-term loans.

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  • Amid a backdrop of deteriorating democratic norms and Russia encroachment, Chinese economic engagement has fueled nationalist anxieties on both sies—driving protests, especially in urban centers like Tbilisi.

 

These cases underscore a broader risk for multinationals and investors: high economic exposure to China in Europe is becoming a political liability, especially in countries where rule of law is weak and transparency limited. As elections or referenda unfold in 2025, firms with China-facing assets or partnerships in these countries should anticipate greater reputational scrutiny, protest risk, and the possibility of abrupt policy reversals, especially if opposition parties gain momentum.

SANCTIONS WATCH

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The United States and Secondary Tariffs: Complicating the Global Trade Landscape for International Business

The election of President Trump in the United States for a second time has severely shaken global trade dynamics. In quick order, the Trump administration has drawn on a unique economic tool, secondary tariffs, as a means to inflict damage on the economies of adversaries like Russia and Iran in a tactic that may also have negative consequences for legitimate businesses that fail to plan and adjust their supply chains or customer base to mitigate unintended financial damage. To date, the U.S. has authorized secondary tariffs on Venezuela and threatened them against Russia and Iran, potentially raising the cost of doing business with countries that do business in these fraught parts of the world. The new secondary tariffs, which differ from the more familiar “secondary sanctions,” threaten to impose blanket import fees on the entire economy of countries that import key products like oil from Venezuela, Iran, and Russia. While secondary tariffs do not threaten the severe consequences associated with the more familiar secondary sanctions – such as heavy fines or even blacklisting from the US financial system – the sudden explosion of costs for private companies that can be inflicted by tariffs can be highly disruptive to supply chains for the many companies that rely on imported goods.

 

  • On April 3, a bipartisan group of senators co-sponsored legislation which threatened, among other things, 500% tariffs on Russian oil, gas, and other natural resources should Moscow fail to negotiate a ceasefire with Ukraine in good faith. China and India are the leading importers of Russian commodities, while some EU countries such as Czechia, Hungary, and Slovakia also continue to rely on Russian energy. Therefore, if such tariffs come into effect, any US company that depends on imports from these countries could be affected.

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  • On 30 March, President Trump threatened tariffs on countries that imported Russian oil, suggesting a range of 25-50%. The US president also suggested he might impose secondary tariffs on purchasers of Iranian oil. These threats, so far, have not materialized but the statements themselves showcase that this administration views secondary tariffs as a key tool of US foreign policy.

 

  • On March 24, President Trump issued an executive order to authorize a 25% tariff on any country which purchased Venezuelan oil. Although such tariffs are yet to be implemented, the most obvious targets for this order would be China and India – the two largest importers of Venezuelan oil and the third and seventh-largest exporters to the US, respectively.

 

Secondary tariffs represent a new policy tool that has not been adopted by past administrations. These tariffs are broadly comparable to secondary sanctions – an economic stick designed to eliminate sanctions evasion by targeting third countries – and were most recently employed by the Biden administration to blacklist banks and other financial institutions that facilitated transactions for Russia’s defense industry (such as by processing payments for dual-use goods). Both penalties – secondary tariffs and secondary sanctions – seek to improve sanctions enforcement by punishing not just the sanctions target itself, but also those who do business with the designated adversary.

Understanding the Difference:
Traditional Secondary Sanctions vs Trump’s Secondary Tariffs

Traditional Secondary Sanctions

  • Targeted at specific entities (e.g. financial institutions), meaning that only entities which violate sanctions will be affected

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  • Impose heavy penalties up to blacklisting from the US financial system

Trump's Secondary Tariffs

  • Targeted at entire economies, meaning that all companies who import products from countries that violate the secondary tariffs will be affected

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  • Impose sweeping tariffs, much of which will ultimately be paid by US businesses that import from targeted countries

With secondary tariffs emerging as a favored tool of US economic power, businesses should take steps now to minimize risks to their supply chains. As of May 2025, markets were stabilizing as Washington begins to deliver on some trade deals with countries such as the UK and China that had been hit by President Trump’s April 2 “Liberation Day” tariffs, but these measures – including at least the threat of secondary tariffs – appear set to remain a core tool of US power for at least the duration of this administration. The strategies that businesses adopted to weather the storm of Liberation Day early this year provide a useful playbook for how to best mitigate these risks.

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  • Minimize reliance on potentially targeted countries. Businesses can reduce their exposure to secondary tariffs by diversifying supply chains as much as possible away from countries likely to be targeted by Washington’s secondary measures. These most prominently include countries that are significant trading partners of US adversaries such as Russia, Venezuela and Iran.

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  • Negotiate exceptions. In addition to broad industry-based exemptions, some companies found success in directly negotiating carveouts with the administration over specific products that are critical to their businesses. Maintaining access to the administration will be key, and with tariffs already widely levied, it is possible for companies to get ahead of additional secondary tariffs by lobbying for exemptions now.
     

  • Maintain awareness of relevant geopolitical developments. Secondary tariffs of the kind threatened against Russia are specifically tied to Moscow’s approach to ceasefire negotiations with Ukraine. The course of these negotiations – and the Trump administration’s stance in them – therefore serves as a key indicator of secondary tariff risk. By staying abreast of geopolitical developments relevant to secondary tariffs, businesses can know when to take precautionary steps like surging key imports and avoid getting caught off-guard by sudden supply disruptions.

Arcanum Global stands ready to help senior executives keep their finger on the pulse of US trade policy and related geopolitical developments. From collection to analysis, our team has been behind the intelligence that drives high-stakes national security decisions. We now bring this experience and mindset to delivering business executives the decisive edge in an increasingly uncertain global environment.

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TECHNOLOGY AND TRADECRAFT CORNER

Unpacking Scenarios-Based Analysis for Elections

Too much election analysis stops at the question of “who wins.” For strategic risk professionals, that’s only the beginning.  The real value lies in understanding what each plausible outcome means for policy direction, governance capacity, and business risk.  At Arcanum Global, we emphasize scenarios-based analysis on a range of geopolitical challenges that our clients confront, positioning our analytic team as a reliable service provider for businesses seeking an intelligence advantage in shifting political landscapes. What does this look like?

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  • Instead of focusing narrowly on polling leads or anticipated winners, we recommend outlining three to four plausible outcome scenarios based on your resident expertise. Each scenario should consider not just the victor, but the coalition that emerges, the capacity to govern, the public response.

 

  • As part of your scenario generation process, you should consider pulling together a brainstorming session of diverse experts and call on them to identify key drivers of the scenarios as well as reveal key assumptions and key uncertainties.

Why It Matters

Political Forecasting is inherently uncertain – especially in environments with fragmented institutions or rising populism. Scenario based analysis gives your clients or internal stakeholders a more resilient framework to plan for policy shifts, civil unrest, and investment conditions regardless of surprise outcomes. 

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Example: Bolivia 2025

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In Bolivia’s upcoming election, the critical risk insight is not simply whether the ruling MAS or the opposition wins. It’s how various configurations—such as a fractured MAS bloc, a weak opposition-led government, or mass mobilizations in contest regions—will affect key sectors like lithium, foreign investment, and public stability.

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Analyst Tip: Use a matrix to weight combinations of:

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  • Electoral outcomes (win/loss margins)

  • Governing coalition strength

  • Institutional response (courts, military, regulators)

  • Legitimacy and protest risk

 

Once this is complete, your team should identify the key drivers and assumptions/uncertainties as part of your election-related scenarios. The goal isn’t to predict the election. It is to map the risk terrain your business or client must operate within to succeed.

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